Thursday, August 14, 2014
Thursday, May 15, 2014
The real story of the conflict in western Assam
Even as bodies of children, women and men killed in the
recent violence in western Assam were being buried, rival politicians
jumped in to gain political mileage. The heated exchange among national
leaders over the issue has generated more heat than light, and has
served to mask the complex reality leading to the current conflict in
the region.
This is unfortunate because such irresponsible politicking can sow
the seeds of even greater tension in a bewilderingly diverse and
geo-politically sensitive region, so close to Chicken’s Neck, a stretch
of land just 20 km wide that links the north-east with the rest of
India.
The troubles of western Assam just after elections in
Kokrajhar sprang from the bitter and messy political battle in that
constituency ahead of the elections. Kokrajhar is the administrative
headquarters of the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD),
which has historically elected Bodo lawmakers.
BTAD is a special administrative region comprising four
districts in Assam, created a decade ago after a tripartite peace accord
between the Centre, the state government and former militants belonging
to the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), who gave up their demand for a
separate state in exchange for autonomy. The political party launched by
the former rebels, Bodoland People’s Front, captured power in the
region.
Ahead of this election, the four-time member of Parliament (MP) from Kokrajhar, Sansuma Khungur Bwismuthiary,
was denied a ticket by his own party. Bwismuthiary had acquired the
reputation of a fiery politician among Bodos over the past few years,
thanks largely to his uncharitable remarks on non-Bodos of the state.
Given that the Bodos are not a numerical majority in Kokrajhar, the BPF
probably dropped Bwismuthiary to avoid consolidating the non-Bodo vote,
and instead chose another prominent Bodo leader and former state cabinet
minister, Chandan Brahma.
Bwismuthiary poured cold water on such calculations and
filed his nomination papers as an independent candidate, and weaned a
substantial chunk of his supporters away from the BPF fold to campaign
for him. To add to this, another high-profile candidate, Ranjit Shekhar Mooshahary,
former governor of Meghalaya and former National Security Guards (NSG)
chief, joined the fray on a Trinamool Congress ticket. The influential
All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) extended its support to an independent
candidate, Urkhao Gwra Brahma, a former MP and student leader.
Even as Bodo loyalities were getting divided, non-Bodos rallied behind a common candidate, Naba Kumar Saraniya. Saraniya, who uses the alias Heera,
is a former commander of a dreaded battalion of the United Liberation
Front of Assam (ULFA) and belongs to the Saraniya Kachari tribe.
The tribe is a sub-group of the umbrella Bodo-Kachari
fold, which once encompassed the Bodos and several other plains tribes
of Assam. The Bodos are the largest of Bodo-Kachari ethnicity whose
sub-groups are spread across a few north-eastern states and neighbouring
West Bengal. With the passage of time and changing cultural influences
over the centuries, the Saraniyas, along with several other communities,
have moved away from their heritage and no longer speak the
Bodo-Kachari tongue but a variant closer to Assamese.
Heera Saraniya’s claim of belonging to a scheduled tribe
(ST) was contested by Bodo groups even after the acceptance of his
nomination papers by the Election Commission. Kokrakjhar is a
constituency reserved for STs.
Bodos and non-Bodos have shared an uneasy relationship in
the BTAD for long. The non-Bodos, comprising the caste Assamese, other
tribes, ethnic groups such as the Koch Rajbongshis clamouring for ST
status, Bengali-speaking Hindus and Bengali-speaking Muslims constitute
the majority in BTAD, and the experience of being ruled by a minority
discomfited many.
Saraniya was able to bank on such sentiments and secured
the backing of several influential leaders of non-Bodo communities. The
All Bodoland Minority Students’ Union (ABMSU), dominated largely by
Bengali-speaking Muslims, and a faction of the All Koch Rajbongshi
Students’ Union (AKRSU) came out in open support of Heera Saraniya
during the poll campaigns, asking people to vote for someone who could
represent the cause of non-Bodos in the region.
There were reports about non-Bodos voting en masse for
Saraniya on polling day, making the BPF leadership jittery. Prominent
BPF leaders such as Pramila Rani Brahma made inflammatory remarks
against Muslims of the region, and the attacks on that community
followed a few days later, igniting fears of a repeat of a 2012-like
situation, when more than 100 people from both Bodo and Muslim
communities were killed and hundreds of thousands of Bengali Muslims
fled their homes in panic.
Even in that year, the violence was preceded by sharp
exchanges between an aggressive Bodo leadership, which was mobilizing
opinion for the creation of a separate state, and the Muslims, who
demanded that the BTAD be scrapped as it had not benefited anyone other
than the Bodos. While a substantial section of non-Bodos harbour
resentment against the BTAD, it is the leaders of the Bengali Muslim
community who have been most vocal in their opposition. Already facing
flak or failing to deliver on their promises of developing the BTAD
region, the BPF leadership became insecure and upped the ante against
Muslim settlers.
The politics of competitive extremism in the region and
the consequent polarization is a direct product of the history of
misguided interventions by successive Central and state governments in
addressing the vulnerabilities and insecurities of different communities
living in the region. In trying to pacify one aggrieved ethnic group,
the state has often ended up making other communities insecure,
perpetuating conflict in the region.
When the Bodo movement first sprang up, it was brutally
suppressed. By 2003, the reaction to the movement had moved to the other
extreme, with a willing Centre amending the Indian constitution to
create the BTAD, turning a blind eye to the interests of other
communities. Previously, such a body could only exist in hill areas of
north-eastern states according to the Sixth Schedule of the
constitution.
Creating the BTAD has only served to antagonize the
non-Bodos, lending power to organizations such as the Sanmilita
Janagosthiya Aikyamancha (SJA), an umbrella grouping of 20 non-Bodo
organizations. The chief minister of Assam had to hold out assurances
time and again during his election campaign in this part of the state
that “there would be no further division of Assam”.
The Bodo peace accord has clearly not led to peace in the
region. The other big failure has been the inability to solve the
problem of illegal immigration. As a result, all settlers or
Bengali-speaking Muslims are tarred as Bangladeshis even though a
substantial section among them has been living here since the British
Raj.
The Bangladeshi tag, however, makes all of them soft
targets whenever conflicts flare up in the region. Other communities
such as the ‘adivasis’ have also born the brunt of violence by Bodo
extremists in the past but it is the Bengali-speaking Muslims that have
suffered the greatest casualties over the past three decades in western
Assam.
Unless the mistakes of the past are acknowledged and the
perpetrators of violence brought to book, these incidents of violence
will only prepare the ground for even bigger conflicts in the future. If
the inflamed passions of western Assam are to be doused, both civil
society and the polity have to rise above partisanship and petty
politicking to bring peace to the region.
Source: http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/DkmMauJSK8Wtcxy5F82o7H/The-real-story-of-the-conflict-in-western-Assam.html
Tuesday, April 15, 2014
Social Mobilization for Higher Education: Sequence Exemplar of Tezpur University Jonai Campus Movement 2013
The Outcome: Mobilizing success |
The Communication: Diffusion of grievances for action |
The mobilization: Women's power |
The issue: Lending a voice |
Social
movement mobilization have taken place across the globe on various
issues. Here's an exemplar of social movement for higher education in
Jonai of Dhemaji district, Assam, India articulated and participated by social organizations,
educationists, students and masses. The above is bottom-up
representation of mobilization of people in symmetry on the issue,
reason for mobilization, communication of grievances through potential
effective channel(the above is Prof Mrinal Miri, noted Indian
educationist) and the outcome of people's mobilization. Social networks
like Facebook, Twitter and MisingOnline were used as communication
tools to diffuse information and updates.The events took place in
April-May 2013. The credit goes to fellow members of
ethnic Mising community and other compassionate participating
subalterns. Despite hurdles created by politicians in connivance with
lackadaisical administrators to block the project, the land allotment
finally took place due to mobilization.(Pictures are not my own.). One
can read more details about this small scale social movement here.
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